

Multilateral Supervaluationism and Classicality

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Introduction

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Goal: Patch this hole

(Multilateral) Supervaluationism

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 - Definitely false if false on all precisifications (*superfalse*)
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- Truth = supertruth

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- SV validates every classical inference (schema)
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and existential elimination

Graff Fara (2003) and Williamson (2018):

- Such metainferences are central to inferential practice
- SV cannot give an account of good deductive reasoning
 - Esp. without restricted versions/recapture
- SV lacks satisfying proof theory

Multilateral Logics

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For every \mathcal{L} sentence A , we have three *signed formulae* in \mathcal{L}_S

- $+A$ (strong assertion of A)
- $\oplus A$ (weak assertion)
- $\ominus A$ (weak rejection)

Multilateral logics are ND systems between signed formulae

Multilateral Supervaluationism

The idea behind MSV:

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Within this approach, (I&S, 2022b) defined three logics:

1. SML, the basic propositional modal ($\Delta A =$ 'definitely A ')
2. SML^- , slightly weaker to allow for *higher-order vagueness*
3. $QSML^-$, extension to $FOL_=$

SML Operational Rules

$$(+\wedge I.) \frac{+A \quad +B}{+A \wedge B}$$

$$(+\wedge E.1) \frac{+A \wedge B}{+A}$$

$$(+\wedge E.2) \frac{+A \wedge B}{+B}$$

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$$(\ominus I.) \frac{\oplus A}{\ominus \neg A} \quad (\ominus E.) \frac{\ominus \neg A}{\oplus A} \quad (\oplus \neg I.) \frac{\ominus A}{\oplus \neg A} \quad (\oplus \neg E.) \frac{\oplus \neg A}{\ominus A}$$

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$$(+\Delta I.) \frac{+A}{+\Delta A} \quad (+\Delta E.) \frac{+\Delta A}{+A}$$

$$(\oplus \Delta I.) \frac{+A}{\oplus \Delta A} \quad (\oplus \Delta E.) \frac{\oplus \Delta A}{+A}$$

Coordination Principles

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{(Rejection)} & \frac{+A}{\perp} \quad \frac{\ominus A}{\perp} & \begin{array}{c} [+A] \\ \vdots \\ \perp \\ \ominus A \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} [\ominus A] \\ \vdots \\ \perp \\ +A \end{array} \end{array}$$

Coordination Principles

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \text{(Rejection)} \frac{+A}{\perp} \frac{\ominus A}{\perp} & \text{(SR}_1\text{)} \frac{[+A]}{\vdots} \frac{\perp}{\ominus A} & \text{(SR}_2\text{)} \frac{[\ominus A]}{\vdots} \frac{\perp}{+A}
 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{cc}
 \text{(Assertion)} \frac{+A}{\oplus A} & \text{(Weak Inference)} \frac{\oplus A}{\oplus B} \frac{[+A]}{+ \vdots} \frac{+B}{\oplus B}
 \end{array}$$

Where $+ \vdots$ means all undischarged assumptions are signed with $+$, and $(+\Delta I.)$ and $(\oplus \Delta I.)$ were not used

QSML⁻

$$(+\forall I.) \frac{+A[a/x]}{+\forall x A} \text{ if } a \text{ is any constant symbol not occurring in undischarged assumptions}$$

$$(+\forall E.) \frac{+\forall x A}{+A[a/x]}$$

$$(+ = I.) \frac{\begin{array}{c} [+Fa] \\ \vdots \\ +Fb \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} [+Fb] \\ \vdots \\ +Fa \end{array}}{+a = b} \text{ where } F \text{ is a predicate symbol not occurring in undischarged assumptions}$$

$$(+ = E.1) \frac{+a = b \quad +Fa}{+Fb}$$

$$(+ = E.2) \frac{+a = b \quad +Fb}{+Fa}$$

Restricted Rules in MSV

The MSV systems derive:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 [+A] \\
 +: \\
 (+ \rightarrow I.) \frac{+B}{+A \rightarrow B}
 \end{array}
 \quad
 \begin{array}{c}
 [+A] \quad [+B] \\
 +: \quad +: \\
 (+ \vee E.) \frac{+A \vee B \quad +C \quad +C}{+C}
 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 [+ \neg A] \\
 +: \\
 (+ \neg E.) \frac{\perp}{+A}
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 \quad
 \begin{array}{c}
 [+A[a/x]] \\
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(I&S, 2022b): this solves Graff Fara and Williamson's challenge

- We have simple, harmonious proof theory
- With restricted versions of the invalid classical metarules

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However: consider *reductio*:

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- We cannot establish on which levels SML, SML⁻, QSML⁻ behave classically
 - We don't know which departures we have to justify/explain
 - Or whether all differences are *SV-necessary*

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- We cannot establish on which levels SML, SML⁻, QSML⁻ behave classically
 - We don't know which departures we have to justify/explain
 - Or whether all differences are *SV-necessary*
- It is unclear how (I&S)'s derived rules actually relate to the classical principles they are supposed to refine

Goals

- 1 Develop a method for comparing valid principles of any given level (theorems, inferences, metainferences, metametainferences, ...) between uni- and multilateral logics

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- 3 Investigate potential for SV-acceptable classicality improvements
- 4 Reassess the response to Graff Fara and Williamson

Measuring Classicality

Inferential Levels and Validity

Definition

Let \mathcal{L} be some formal language, with \mathcal{L}^0 its set of wff.

$$\mathcal{L}^{n+1} := \{ \langle \Gamma, \Psi \rangle \mid \Gamma \cup \{ \Psi \} \subseteq \mathcal{L}^n \}.$$

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Level 1

$$p \vee q, \neg q \Rightarrow^1 r \rightarrow p$$

Level 2

$$\frac{p \vee q, \neg q \Rightarrow^1 r \rightarrow p}{p \Rightarrow^1 q \rightarrow p} 2$$

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$$\frac{p \vee q, \neg q \Rightarrow^1 r \rightarrow p}{p \Rightarrow^1 q \rightarrow p} 2$$

Definition

- $\Gamma \Rightarrow^1 \Psi$ is **valid** iff $\Gamma \vdash \Psi$
- $\Gamma \Rightarrow^{n+1} \Psi$ is **valid** iff either some $\gamma \in \Gamma$ is not valid, or Ψ is valid (Global validity)



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Logics in different languages are compared on their inference *rules*, expressed via *schemas*

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E.g. in the sentential (not quantified) setting:

Definition

Take a set of metalinguistic variables $\mathcal{A} = \{A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots\}$, and let \mathcal{A}^B be its closure of under \neg and \wedge . The set UBS^n of level n schemas is:

$$UBS^1 := \{\langle \Lambda, \Omega \rangle \mid \Lambda \cup \{\Omega\} \subseteq \mathcal{A}^B\}.$$

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But: this assumes \mathcal{L}^0 is closed under \neg and \wedge

The Substitution Issue

(Conjunction Elimination): $A_1, A_2 \wedge A_3 \Rightarrow^1 A_2$

Q: What are its instances in a multilateral language?

1. Let A_1, A_2, A_3 range over signed formulae
 - $+r, (+p) \wedge (+q) \Rightarrow^1 +p$?
2. Let them range over sentences
 - $r, p \wedge q \Rightarrow^1 p$?
3. Let A_1, A_2, A_3 range over sentences, *then* add force-markers. **But how?**
- 3a. Include all combinations of force markers
 - $+r, +(p \wedge q) \Rightarrow^1 \ominus p$?
- 3b. Include only 'uniform' ones (prefixing the same sign to every sentence)
 - $\ominus r, \ominus(p \wedge q) \Rightarrow^1 \ominus p$?
- 3c. Only apply +
 - $\ominus r, +(p \wedge q) \Rightarrow^1 +p$

Multilateral Schemas

Solution: Define a separate notion of *multilateral schema*

Definition

Start with *sentence variables* $\mathcal{A} = \{A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots\}$ and *formula variables* $\Phi = \{\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \dots\}$.

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Valid in \mathcal{K} on language \mathcal{L}_S iff valid for all substitutions $\sigma = \sigma_{\mathcal{A}} \cup \sigma_{\Phi}$, with $\sigma_{\mathcal{A}} : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{L}^0$ and $\sigma_{\Phi} : \Phi \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_S^0$

Multilateral Schemas

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- We can express rules that combine these aspects, such as (Multilateral Reductio):

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Which has instances such as:

$$\frac{\oplus p, +\neg p \Rightarrow \perp}{\oplus p \Rightarrow +p}$$

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Definition

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(MR):

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Unilateralization \rightarrow

(CR):

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$\xrightarrow{\text{Unilateralization}}$

(CR):

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So: MSV systems depart from classical logic at level 2, because they invalidate (MR), while classical logic validates $U[(\text{MR})] = (\text{CR})$

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A: When any level n multilateral schema is valid in \mathcal{K} iff its unilateralization is classically valid.

Moreover: \mathcal{K} is strictly weaker/stronger than classical logic on n when the entailment only goes in one direction

Results

SML and SML⁻

Theorem

Both SML and SML⁻ are:

- Precisely classical on level 1
- Strictly weaker than classical logic on every $n > 1$

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Moreover: We cannot do better

Theorem

Any logic at least as strong as SML⁻ but classical at level 2 won't allow for borderline cases:

- $\vdash \neg \Delta A \wedge \neg \Delta \neg A \vdash \perp$

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Conclusion: Failure of metainferences is *necessary* for the (multilateral) supervaluationist

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But again we cannot do better

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Any ND which derives the rules of QSML⁻ but is classical on level 1 doesn't leave room for higher-order vagueness:

- Related to work by Graff Fara (2003) and Zardini (2013)

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Theorem

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- Related to work by Graff Fara (2003) and Zardini (2013)

Conclusion: In FOL₌, failure of classical theorems is *necessary* for the (multilateral) supervaluationist

Conclusion

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- 3 We can relate (I&S, 2022b) derived restricted rules to the respective classical principles
Recall the question how e.g. $(+\neg E.)$ relates to *reductio*

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- 3 We can relate (I&S, 2022b) derived restricted rules to the respective classical principles

Recall the question how e.g. ($+ \neg E.$) relates to *reductio*

$$\begin{array}{c}
 [+ \neg A] \\
 +: \\
 \frac{\perp}{+A} \\
 (+ \neg E.)
 \end{array}
 \xrightarrow{\text{Restrict.}}
 \begin{array}{c}
 [+ \neg A] \\
 \vdots \\
 \frac{\perp}{+A} \\
 (+ \neg E.*)
 \end{array}
 \xrightarrow{\text{Admis./Val.}}
 \frac{\varphi, + \neg A \Rightarrow \perp}{\varphi \Rightarrow +A}
 \xrightarrow{\text{Unilat.}}$$

$$\frac{A_1, \neg A_2 \Rightarrow \perp}{A_1 \Rightarrow A_2}$$

Sentential Acceptability

For SML, SML⁻:

- 1 Results that the failure of the metainferences is the only departure from classicality we need to answer for
 - it all boils down to (MR)
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$$\frac{A_1, \neg A_2 \Rightarrow \perp}{A_1 \Rightarrow A_2} \xrightarrow{\text{Expresses}} \text{Reductio}$$

First-order Acceptability

For QSML⁻:

- 1 We now know that the failure of the metainferences is **not** the only departure from classicality we need to answer for
- 2 The failure of =-substitution raises a new instance of Acceptability
 - (I &S, 2022b) suggest a contextual reading: different ways of referring to one object may be associated with different standards of definite tallness/darkness/...
 - This reading justifies failure of =-substitution in Δ -contexts
- 3 Results that =-substitution is the only level 1 departure from classicality to answer for
- 4 It is necessary to account for higher-order vagueness

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- Understanding/intuitions about unilateral logic can be brought to bear on the multilateral setting
- SV and classical logic are a case study

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